Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power

Grunewald A, Hansen E, Pönitzsch G (2020)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2020

Journal

Economic Theory Springer Verlag (Germany)

Book Volume: 70

Pages Range: 273-311

Journal Issue: 1

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x

Abstract

We study how policy choice and political selection are affected by the concentration of political power. In a setting with inefficient policy gambles, variations in power concentration give rise to a trade-off. On the one hand, power-concentrating institutions allocate more power to the voters’ preferred candidate. On the other hand, they induce the adoption of more overly risky policies and decrease the voters’ capability to select well-suited politicians. We show that full concentration of power is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest between voters and politicians is small. Otherwise, an intermediate level of power concentration is optimal.

Involved external institutions

Universität zu Köln DE Germany (DE) Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg DE Germany (DE) Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

Grunewald, A., Hansen, E., & Pönitzsch, G. (2020). Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power. Economic Theory, 70(1), 273-311. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x

MLA:

Grunewald, Andreas, Emanuel Hansen, and Gert Pönitzsch. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power." Economic Theory 70.1 (2020): 273-311.

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