Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists†
Hansen E (2022)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2022
Journal
Book Volume: 14
Pages Range: 35-75
Journal Issue: 3
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200041
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.
Involved external institutions
Germany (DE)How to cite
APA:
Hansen, E. (2022). Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists†. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(3), 35-75. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200041
MLA:
Hansen, Emanuel. "Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists†." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14.3 (2022): 35-75.
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