Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?

Lundgren B (2025)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2025

Journal

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Verlag (Germany)

DOI: 10.1007/s10677-025-10514-y

Abstract

So-called “deepfakes” (i.e., highly believable but fabricated media) are infamous for their potential political application. However, they can also contain false information about individuals, which raises the question whether deepfakes can violate a moral right to privacy. This question is directly related to the often ignored but still highly contentious issue of whether the spreading or use of false or fake information can violate a moral right to privacy. While such queries normally turn on how we conceptualize a moral right to privacy, they are answered here based on premises that any conception of the moral right to privacy must adhere to.

Authors with CRIS profile

Björn Lundgren Lehrstuhl für Theory and Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (Alexander von Humboldt-Professur)

How to cite

APA:

Lundgren, B. (2025). Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10514-y

MLA:

Lundgren, Björn. "Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy?" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2025).

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