Paha J (2023)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2023
Book Volume: 19
Pages Range: 357-366
Journal Issue: 3
This article presents a model where the managers of two firms decide about adopting a sustainable production technology (or product). It demonstrates under what conditions a firm experiences a first mover disadvantage from going green, which may potentially be overcome by a sustainability agreement serving as a device for equilibrium selection in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. If the technology adoption game is, however, a prisoner's dilemma, the sustainability agreement must be structured like a hardcore cartel.
APA:
Paha, J. (2023). Sustainability Agreements and First Mover Disadvantages. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 19(3), 357-366. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007
MLA:
Paha, Johannes. "Sustainability Agreements and First Mover Disadvantages." Journal of Competition Law and Economics 19.3 (2023): 357-366.
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