Implementing artificial consciousness
Dung L, Kersten L (2024)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2024
Journal
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12532
Abstract
Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon-based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue that several recently proposed substantive constraints are implausible, or at least are not well-supported, insofar as they conflate intuitions about computational implementation generally and consciousness specifically. We argue instead that the mechanistic account of computation can explain several of the intuitions driving implementationalism and non-computationalism in a manner which is consistent with artificial consciousness. Our argument provides indirect support for computationalism about consciousness and the view that conventional artificial systems can be conscious.
Authors with CRIS profile
Leonard Dung
Lehrstuhl für Theory and Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (Alexander von Humboldt-Professur)
Involved external institutions
Canada (CA)How to cite
APA:
Dung, L., & Kersten, L. (2024). Implementing artificial consciousness. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12532
MLA:
Dung, Leonard, and Luke Kersten. "Implementing artificial consciousness." Mind & Language (2024).
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