Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion

De Haas S, Paha J (2021)

Publication Type: Journal article

Publication year: 2021

Journal

Review of Industrial Organization Springer Verlag (Germany)

Book Volume: 58

Pages Range: 431-454

Journal Issue: 3

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y

Abstract

This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.

Involved external institutions

Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen DE Germany (DE)

How to cite

APA:

De Haas, S., & Paha, J. (2021). Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion. Review of Industrial Organization, 58(3), 431-454. https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y

MLA:

De Haas, Samuel, and Johannes Paha. "Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion." Review of Industrial Organization 58.3 (2021): 431-454.

BibTeX: Download