Selling two goods optimally
Giannakopoulos Y, Koutsoupias E (2015)
Publication Type: Conference contribution, Original article
Publication year: 2015
Journal
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Book Volume: 9135
Pages Range: 650-662
Conference Proceedings Title: Proceedings of the 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP)
Event location: Kyoto
ISBN: 9783662476659
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-47666-6_52
Open Access Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03399
Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer’s valuations for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rules of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form [0, b] which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how slightly relaxed versions of it can still be used to design mechanisms that have very good approximation ratios with respect to the optimal revenue, through a “convexification” process.
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APA:
Giannakopoulos, Y., & Koutsoupias, E. (2015). Selling two goods optimally. In Naoki Kobayashi, Bettina Speckmann, Kazuo Iwama, Magnus M. Halldorsson (Eds.), Proceedings of the 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP) (pp. 650-662). Kyoto, JP: Springer Verlag.
MLA:
Giannakopoulos, Yiannis, and Elias Koutsoupias. "Selling two goods optimally." Proceedings of the 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2015, Kyoto Ed. Naoki Kobayashi, Bettina Speckmann, Kazuo Iwama, Magnus M. Halldorsson, Springer Verlag, 2015. 650-662.
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