Selling two goods optimally
Giannakopoulos Y, Koutsoupias E (2018)
Publication Type: Journal article
Publication year: 2018
Journal
Book Volume: 261
Pages Range: 432-445
Open Access Link: http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03399
Abstract
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional assumptions, we give exact, closed-form formulas for the prices and allocation rule of the optimal selling mechanism. As a side result we give the first example of an optimal mechanism in an i.i.d. setting over a support of the form [0,b] which is not deterministic. Since our framework is based on duality techniques, we were also able to demonstrate how slightly relaxed versions of it can still be used to design mechanisms that have very good approximation ratios with respect to the optimal revenue, through a “convexification” process.
Authors with CRIS profile
Involved external institutions
United Kingdom (GB)How to cite
APA:
Giannakopoulos, Y., & Koutsoupias, E. (2018). Selling two goods optimally. Information and Computation, 261, 432-445. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2018.02.016
MLA:
Giannakopoulos, Yiannis, and Elias Koutsoupias. "Selling two goods optimally." Information and Computation 261 (2018): 432-445.
BibTeX: Download