Schmolke KU, Utikal V (2016)
Publication Language: English
Publication Type: Other publication type
Publication year: 2016
Series: FAU Discussion Papers in Economics
Journal Issue: 09
Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning authority. We find that fines for non-reporting insiders, rewards and even simple commands increase the probability of whistleblowing. We find the strongest effect for fines. Situational determinants also influence the willingness to blow the whistle: Insiders who are negatively affected by the misconduct are more likely to blow the whistle than non-affected or profiting insiders. Those (negatively affected) victims are also sensitive to the misconduct’s impact on the authority sanctioning the misconduct (public authority or employer): Whistleblowing is more likely if the enforcement authority is negatively affected compared to positively or not affected.
APA:
Schmolke, K.U., & Utikal, V. (2016). Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants.
MLA:
Schmolke, Klaus Ulrich, and Verena Utikal. Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants. 2016.
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