Brzuska C, Fischlin M, Lehmann A, Schröder D (2009)
Publication Status: Published
Publication Type: Conference contribution, Conference Contribution
Publication year: 2009
Pages Range: 117-128
Conference Proceedings Title: BIOSIG 2009
Event location: Darmstadt
ISBN: 9783885792499
URI: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=79960816652&origin=inward
Sanitizable signatures have been introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS 2005) and allow an authorized party, the sanitizer, to modify a predetermined part of a signed message without invalidating the signature. Brzuska et al. (PKC 2009) gave the first comprehensive formal treatment of the five security properties for such schemes. These are unforgeability, immutability, privacy, transparency and accountability. They also provide a modification of the sanitizable signature scheme proposed by Ateniese et al. such that it provably satisfies all security requirement. Unfortunately, their scheme comes with rather large signature sizes and produces computational overhead that increases with the number of admissible modifications. In this paper we show that by sacrificing the transparency property -thus allowing to distinguish whether a message has been sanitized or not- we can obtain a sanitizable signature scheme that is still provably secure concerning the other aforementioned properties but significantly more efficient. We propose a construction that is based solely on regular signature schemes, produces short signatures and only adds a small computational overhead.
APA:
Brzuska, C., Fischlin, M., Lehmann, A., & Schröder, D. (2009). Sanitizable signatures: How to partially delegate control for authenticated data. In BIOSIG 2009 (pp. 117-128). Darmstadt.
MLA:
Brzuska, Chris, et al. "Sanitizable signatures: How to partially delegate control for authenticated data." Proceedings of the Special Interest Group on Biometrics and Electronic Signatures, BIOSIG 2009, Darmstadt 2009. 117-128.
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